Many people believe that Somalia's economy has been in chaos since the collapse of its national government in 1991. We take a comparative institutional approach to examine Somalia's performance relative to other African countries both when Somalia had a government and during its extended period of anarchy. We find that although Somalia is poor, its relative economic performance has improved during its period of statelessness. We also describe how Somalia has provided basic law and order and a currency, which have enabled the country to achieve the coordination that has led to improvements in its standard of living.
1 Somalia has lacked a national government since the fall of Siad Barre's dictatorship in 1991. Rival factions immediately plunged the country into civil war in failed attempts to install themselves as the new national government. U.S. and UN humanitarian and military intervention from 1993 through 1995 failed to restore peace.
In fact, the Somalis united against the foreign presence and eventually forced the U.S. to withdraw. Since the U.S. withdrawal episodes of criminal behavior and violence have occurred, but not at the levels seen when factions vied to control a single government. In fact, with the relative peace, there is evidence that Somalia has been able to increase its standard of living while remaining stateless.
Somalia's extended period without a national government in the modern era provides us with a unique opportunity to study the political economy of a stateless order.
Some theorists (Hobbes 1651 , Buchanan 1975 have argued that without a government society would plunge into a war of all against all, the result of which would be a life that is "nasty, brutish, and short." In the absence of a complete collapse, standard economic theory still predicts that many public goods and more complex market transactions would not be provided. On the other hand, a few theorists (Rothbard 1973 , Friedman 1989 have contended that a stateless "anarcho-capitalist" society could provide essential public goods and maintain a high standard of living.
Somalia's experience fails to conform to any of these theories perfectly. Despite the initial violence, the country is relatively peaceful now, and living standards have not collapsed. Some public goods are being provided with more success than others. But Somalia fails to live up to the thriving economy predicted by anarcho-capitalists. The Somali experience does, however, provide insight to the robustness of markets when states collapse. This paper approaches Somalia from a comparative institutional perspective.
Somalia's achievements in a stateless order are compared to its performance when it had a state as well as to the performance of neighboring African states. Most African nation states are far from governments that only correct market failures and provide the background institutions for markets to operate. In fact, George Ayittey (1998) refers to many African countries as "vampire states" that suck the life-blood out of the population for the benefit of the rulers. Somali anarchy also falls far short of the ideal stateless institutional environment anticipated by Rothbard and Friedman. This paper compares these imperfect institutions in Somalia and Africa. Somalia's experience can inform both political economy theory and African development policy.
Although some standard data are available, much of the traditional data economists use to measure development is lacking in Somalia. In this paper we use traditional measures when available as well as ethnographic and anecdotal evidence from work in other social sciences. Our paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides some background on the major events leading up to the collapse of the Somali state and its economic performance under a national government. Section III examines data on living standards and economic activity to compare Somalia's performance while stateless to when it had a state and to other African countries. Section IV describes how Somalia has produced public goods and other complex market transactions without a state.
Section V contains conclusions.
II. Somalia Before State Collapse
Somalia contains a patchwork of different clans and ethnic groups. Prior to independence, Britain governed the northern region, Somaliland, while Italy ruled the southern region. When Somalia became independent in the 1960s, no sense of national identity existed. Different languages, monetary systems, and styles of government all made central governance difficult. Somalis preferred to be known as Isaaq, Darood, or Bantu rather than Somali because loyalty to one's clan, village, and ethnicity took precedence over loyalty to the national government (Federal Research Division 1993) .
Secret votes by National Assembly members based on clan lineage increasingly demonstrated that the Somali democracy was not functioning well.
In 1969 a military coup assassinated the president and closed down the parliament. The constitution was abolished, and General Siad Barre became dictator.
Shortly after taking power, Barre announced that the new regime's goals would be to put an end to "tribalism, nepotism, corruption, and misrule," and that those goals would be achieved through the application of "Scientific Socialism."
The creation of a command economy to control resources and to funnel power and wealth to political supporters was of paramount importance in the Barre regime.
Goods, capital, and arms supplied by the Soviet Union and other communist countries helped accomplish this (Besteman 1996: 581) . Although Barre had outlawed the use of any terminology referring to the clans, he illegally gave land and water rights to specific clans that supported his rule (Besteman 1996: 126) .
Most Somalis were rural pastoralists or small farmers who traded their produce across Africa and the Middle East on complicated but time-proven trade routes. Since political power was concentrated in urban cities, these rural Somalis had little influence in shaping Barre's policies and were routinely mistreated. Beginning in the 1970s, for example, state laws nationalized access to land and water as well as imposed severe restrictions on the livestock and qat (a popular stimulant) trades, stripping the nomads and rural farmers of their productive assets (Besteman 1996: 127) . By making statecontrolled title registration the only legal way to hold land, the land tenure laws of the 1970s and 1980s quickly resulted in the nationalization of the nation's most fertile and densely populated farmland. This land was then transferred to small cliques of politicians or politically connected businessmen. In some cases entire villages of local farmers in the North, and to a lesser extent in the South, became victims of Barre's scientific socialism (Besteman. 1996: 127) .
The state became the primary means to achieve wealth because the private market was systematically regulated and destroyed by bureaucrats. People increasingly had to turn to state aid to meet their basic survival needs. In 1978 the regime started its political decline, and massive aid from the Soviet Union ceased because of Somalia's war with another Soviet satellite, Ethiopia. This increased the competition between urban bureaucrats and rural farmers for state resources, leaving the countryside in shambles.
The chaos of Somalia's failing economy was made worse by the addition of hundreds of thousands of refugees after Somalia's defeat in the Ogaadeen War.
A major program to resettle all refugees started immediately after Somalia's defeat in the Ogaadeen War. By 1981, 700,000 refugees were being resettled in the North to weaken the Isaaq clan, which was openly resisting Barre's regime (Schraeder: 647) . The northern clans, primarily made up of the Isaaq, were non-hierarchical pastoralists who resisted government attempts at centralization and increased control; the southern clans were more open to political manipulation because of years of political favors and government money (Schraeder: 648) . As refugees displaced northern farmers and the government confiscated ever-larger tracts of land for their resettlement, fighting broke out between the malnourished refugees, the Somali Armed Forces, and the dispossessed farmers. This eventually led to the 1991 civil war. As resettlement continued in the north, it became clear that areas in the South and around Mogadishu would need to be opened for resettlement if all refugees were to receive land. This upset the southern clans, which were previously loyal to Barre's regime, and an insurgency began shortly after the arrival of the first refugees (Schraeder: 651) .
Dismal economic performance accompanied the growing political turmoil in Somalia while it was governed by the national government. Socialism was formally abandoned in 1980, but economic policy did not improve. Government interventions hampered market transactions and racked up public debt while providing few benefits to the average citizen.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the government did conduct a large public investment program, but it was unproductive and created much public debt (Mubarak 1997 (Mubarak : 2028 . In 1989 the consolidated non-financial public sector deficit was 37 percent of GDP; by 1990 the total outstanding foreign debt was 277 percent of GDP (Mubarak 1997 (Mubarak :2028 . The population received few benefits from this spending. About 90 percent of spending was on defense and administration while spending on social services fell to less than 1 percent of GDP during 1988 -1989 (Mubarak 1997 : 2028 .
The banking industry was also in shambles. As Mubarak puts it, In the 1970s and early 1980s the banking system was largely a financing tool for public agencies… The Commercial and Savings Bank was declared bankrupt, and the Development Bank was unable to provide new lending in 1989. The financial system fell into deep crisis and, with the complicity of corrupt officials, most of the daily operations of the banking system fell to the black market (1997: 2028-2029) .
As the public sector failed to provide goods and services during the 1980s, informal black markets expanded to fill the void. The informal sector replaced former government monopolies by providing financial, health, and educational services. For example, the informal sector, "provided credit and investment-financing to small producers, since access to the official credit market was granted only to state monopolies and businessmen with political connections. It facilitated the channeling of remittances by Somalis living abroad and gave private traders access to the foreign exchange" (Mubarak 1997 (Mubarak : 2029 . Overall, by the mid-1980s, the informal black market sector was the largest employer of labor (Mubarak 1997 (Mubarak : 2029 .
In addition, the rural pastoral sector saw particularly few benefits from the national government. The pastoralists employed 70 percent of the labor force and produced 65 percent of the GDP, but only 6 percent of public spending (1.2 percent of GDP) was directed to the sector annually from 1974 -1988 (Mubarak 1997 : 2029 . Most rural pastoralists were either exploited or ignored by Barre's national government. As Little (2003) put it, in rural areas, "the state was an entity that extracted some local resources and was punitive at times, but could not be counted on to govern daily affairs" (p.16).
The Somali national government existed largely to benefit Barre and his allies rather than the average Somali. In fact, the average standard of living was so low that Somalia had one of the lowest per capita food intakes during the 1980s (Farzin 1988) .
The upside to the neglect and exploitation suffered under Barre's rule is that Somalis relied on traditional clan networks and informal markets to survive. These clan networks, which had existed for generations, and the new informal markets that emerged during the 1980s would play an important role in Somalia's economic performance after the national government collapsed in 1991.
III. Economy and Living Standards Without a State
After Barre's government collapsed in 1991, rival warlords plunged the country into civil war, each attempting to install himself as the new dictator. None was successful. After the UN withdrew in 1995, the prospect of a new national government being installed diminished, and so did the fighting. Although multiple governments in exile have been created, none has been able to establish its rule over a significant portion of the country. Today southern Somalia still lacks a regional government. In the north the regions of Somaliland and Puntland have declared their independence, though no national governments recognize them as states. These regional "governments" do provide some administrative services, but they might be better classified as clan-based governance than the type of national government we in the west conceive of.
While the civil war after the government collapsed hurt the economy and lowered living standards, since the achievement of a relative peace the economy has recovered.
Mubarak finds that the Somali economy has suffered more from droughts and the civil war than from the loss of state institutions. Overall, he finds that, "as far as economic welfare is concerned, absence of government has proven to be better than the repressive institutions and improper policies of Barre's government" (1997 Barre's government" ( : 2028 . Little (2003) also finds that some sectors of the Somali economy are doing better than during the prewar years. This is not to say that Somalia has a great business environment. As Little notes, "For the merchant today, there are still fees to be paid to greedy faction leaders and militia at ports and roadblocks but levels of taxation and trade restrictions are considerably below what they were pre-1991" (2003: 7-8) . This section examines the comparative institutional question of how well the imperfect Somali anarchy performs compared to the imperfect Somali state pre-1991 and other imperfect African states.
After examining the rural pastoralist sector of the Somali economy that was largely neglected by the Barre regime, we look for evidence of commercial business activity in urban areas. Finally, we examine general Somali living standards.
The Pastoral Sector
The pastoral sector was largely neglected or harmed by the central government.
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In the rural pastoral lands the government rarely constructed roads, health clinics or schools. The population didn't use the government to settle disputes or administer justice, and the government generally took more in revenue than it gave back in services (Little 2003:15) . Not surprisingly, the pastoral sector has done quite well since the collapse of the central government. Herders who have always relied heavily on social relationships and kinship to gain access to markets do so even more heavily now, and they do so without active government interference. The results are impressive.
The Somali live animal trade, which flows between neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya as well as to overseas markets, has increased dramatically. In Garissa, a major export market in Kenya for southern Somali cattle, the value of cattle sales increased 600 percent and the volume of sales quadrupled from 1989 to 1998 (Little 2003: 91) The livestock sector has experienced some problems, however. Droughts in particular have caused hardships, but this is true for the entire region, not just stateless Somalia. Little notes that, "Pockets of severe food insecurity remain in the Somali borderlands, but local herders have generally fared as well as -if not better thanneighboring pastoral populations. Even with the devastating drought of 1999-2000, the food situation in Somalia was not markedly different from in other parts of the Horn of Africa" (Little 2003: 138) . In fact, Somali herders did better than those in Kenya who saw nearly 50 percent of their cattle perish in recent droughts (Little 2003: 67) .
With the collapse of the government, some might be concerned that lack of security would raise transaction costs and prevent large-scale trade. However, in Somalia this has not happened. Although armed escorts are sometimes hired, transport costs per animal are usually less than $0.01/km, and this price has not increased greatly since the collapse of the government (Little 2003: 103) . In a 1998 survey of 84 rural pastoral traders, only 24 percent of respondents reported security related concerns, and only 13 percent thought security was more of a problem than it was in 1990 (Little 2003: 125) .
Since the rural pastoralists had traditional dispute resolution mechanisms to fall back on (see section IV), security has not been a major issue for herders since state collapse.
The health of the cattle trade is captured by quotes from interviews conducted by Little in 1996 and 1998, including: 'Since the fall of the government we have been doing well in livestock trade' [24 The negative comment, typical of other complaints about prices that Little reports, still illustrates a booming market that has led to increased volume.
The overall performance of the rural pastoral sector in the absence of a state has been quite remarkable. Since the sector depended little on the state, and often suffered under it, pastoral Somalis have generally done better without a nation state than with one.
Commercial Business Activity
Urban commercial business activity interacted more with the national government than the pastoral sector did. Cities have thus been more affected by the government's collapse. In some cities peace has been difficult to achieve. Where peace has been more stable, business activity remains strong. This section will examine major corporate business activity in Somalia as well as general business activity in the city of Borama. Africa's nation states, so the fact that these international companies are willing to do business in Somalia is a strong indication that it has been successful in providing a minimum security of property rights and economic freedom.
Prior to colonialism many African regions had rural pastoral economies without a state, so the fact that Somalia's rural economy has been successful since state collapse is perhaps not surprising. What may be more remarkable is that cities, at least those that are relatively peaceful, have been able to maintain order and business activity without a state.
Borama is one such city.
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Borama is located in the Awdal region of northwest Somalia in the unrecognized
Republic of Somaliland. This region borders Djibouti, Ethopia, the Somaliland province of Woqooyi Galbeed, and the Gulf of Aden. The Somaliland government claims Awdal is part of Somaliland, but it is in fact a sovereign clan council ruled area (Davidson 2001 ).
Adwal's most populous city is Borama, with a population ranging from 150,000 to 300,000 depending on season (Davidson 2001 ). Borama appears to have some type of tax collection for municipal works, as it is cited as having tax revenue of 958,225,000
Somaliland Shillings (roughly $150,000 U.S. dollars) (Somaliland in Figures 2002: 23) .
How these funds are collected or what they are used for is not certain, but considering the city has a population of 300,000, this is a rather small amount of taxation per capita.
What is most interesting is that under clan leadership Adwal has thrived and created a reasonably high standard of living for its inhabitants. now has more than 1,000 students, 45 teachers, and a library of more than 100,000 books (Amoud University 2006).
Borama illustrates that a large city with a variety of businesses can exist without a national government. The fact that international companies are willing to do business in stateless Somalia is also encouraging.
Overall Living Standards
As valuable as sectoral and city studies are, it is useful to examine broader standard of living measures to obtain a more accurate picture of Somalia's level of well being. This is no easy task given that no state exists to collect traditional data, and even Unfortunately, using a broad cross section of countries over a 20 year time period for a region with often unreliable (or uncollected) data limits our metrics of comparison.
We examine 13 measures: the death rate, infant mortality, life expectancy, child Life expectancy in Somalia fell by two years from 1985 to 1990, but it has increased by five years since becoming stateless (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . Only three of the other 42 (Winter 2004 ). According to the Economist, using a mobile phone in Somalia is "generally cheaper and clearer than a call from anywhere else in Africa" (2005: 89).
The collapse of the state has played a major role in the development of communications. Abdullahi Mohammed Hussein, a manager at Telecom Somalia, which was set up in 1994 when there was still fighting in Mogadishu, said, "The government post and telecoms company used to have a monopoly but after the regime was toppled, we were free to set up our own business" (Winter 2004 ). This freedom has led to intense competition in the Somali communication market and has resulted in low prices and good access to services by African standards.
Although all data from Somalia must be treated with some caution, when looking at these 13 measures of living standards, the overall picture seems clear. Somalia may be very poor, but the loss of its government does not appear to have harmed standards of living. On many measures Somalia compares favorably with the other 42 Sub-Saharan countries. Since losing its central government, we find that Somalia improved measures of well being both in absolute terms and relative to other African states.
IV. Public Goods
Urban businessmen, international corporations, and rural pastoralists have all functioned in stateless Somalia, achieving standards of living for the country that are equal or superior to many other African nations. The question is how. Foundation, or meta-market institutions, need to be in place for business to operate. At a minimum, laws that protect person and property, a dispute settlement process, and a currency are needed.
People often assume that these are public goods that the government must provide. But the Somalis have managed to provide forms of all of these without a national government. Coyne (2006) identifies two main mechanisms that have allowed these types of goods to be provided: the use of clan and other local trust networks coupled with the simplification of transactions, and importing governance by relying on foreign institutions. In this section we examine how the Somalis provide law and order and a currency which allow the Somali economy to operate.
Somali Law
Somali law is based on custom, and decentralized clan networks interpret and enforce it. The Somali customary law (Xeer) has existed since pre-colonial times, and it continued to operate under colonial rule. The Somali nation state tried to replace the Xeer with government legislation and enforcement. However, in rural areas and border regions where the Somali government lacked firm control, people continued to apply the common law. When the Somali state collapsed, much of the population returned to their traditional legal system.
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The Xeer outlaws homicide, assault, torture, battery, rape, accidental wounding, kidnapping, abduction, robbery, burglary, theft, arson, extortion, fraud, and property damage (Van Notten 2005: 49) . The legal system focuses on the restitution of victims, not the punishment of criminals. For violations of the law, maximum payments to compensate victims are specified in camels (payment can be made in equivalent monetary value). Typical compensation to the family of a murder victim is 100 camels for a man and 50 for a woman; an animal thief usually must return two animals for every one he stole. Although the Balweyn notes can be distinguished from pre-1991 SoSh, the Somalis have treated them all as the same currency. Unlike a competitive banking system with distinct currencies in which competition could limit the amount of inflation and seigniorage individual issuers could achieve, the competition in Somalia is for seigniorage in the same currency. One would expect this competition to lead to an infinite level of inflation and ultimately public abandonment of the currency. Somalis, however, refuse to accept denominations larger than those that existed in 1991. This has constrained inflation and actually allowed for a relatively stable monetary system to emerge.
Mubarak (2003) percent commodity backed currencies, the effect of the competition for seigniorage coupled with the Somalis' failure to accept new, higher denominations has led to the creation of a stable 'commodity currency' worth its paper, ink, and transport costs.
While such a currency provides some stability, it is not without its problems. To make purchases of any significant size, large bundles are needed. For this reason the SoSh is used alongside U.S. dollars in Somalia. The SoSh is used for small transactions while the dollar is used for larger ones. The Somali people's continued use of the SoSh in absence of a state monopoly is testament to the currency's relative success, as is the fact that it circulates with easy convertability 50km inside the Ethiopian border while the Ethiopian Birr has little circulation in Somalia (Little 2003: 144) . 
V. Conclusion
Since the collapse of its central government, Somalia has not become an anarchocapitalist utopia resembling those described by theorists such as Rothbard (1973) and Friedman (1989) . However, most African states do not come close to approaching many theorists' views of an ideal state either. In a comparative institutional comparison given existing culture, ideology, history, geography, income, and resources, the interesting question is how well does Somalia function compared to realistic alternatives. Menkhaus summarized the Somali view of the state by writing,
The revival of a state is viewed in Somali quarters as a zero-sum game, creating winners and losers in a game with potentially very high stakes. Groups which gain control over a central government will use it to appropriate economic resources at the expense of others, and will use the law, patronage, and the monopoly of legitimate use of violence to protect this advantage. This is the only experience Somalis have had with centralised authority, and it tends to produces risk-aversion and to instigate conflict rather than promote compromise, whenever efforts are made to establish a national government (2003: 408) .
Given this Somali view of the state, the reemergence of a national government would quite likely produce a "vampire state" that would not provide social order but would instead suck the life out of the economy. Ayittey recently wrote that the modern nation state is largely incompatible with traditional indigenous African culture and that, "The rogue African state should be left to the fate it deserves -implosion and state collapse " (2007: 238) .
This paper has explored the consequences of state collapse for a country that existed under the rule of a vampire state. Far from chaos and economic collapse, we find that Somalia is generally doing better than when it had a state. Basic economic order is possible because of the existence of a common law dispute resolution system and a non-activity is possible and that the pastoral sector has expanded. This paper's main contribution to the literature on Somalia's living standards has been to compare them to those of 42 other sub-Saharan African countries both before and after the collapse of the national government. We find that Somalia's living standards have improved generally and that they compare relatively favorably with many existing African states.
Importantly, we find that Somali living standards have often improved, not just in absolute terms, but also relative to other African countries since the collapse of the Somali central government.
